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TOWARD A NATIONAL RESILIENCE FUND 
Paul Rose 
ABSTRACT—COVID-19’s economic impact has been catastrophic for state 
and local governments. By Federal Reserve estimates, income and sales 
revenues will have declined by over $50 billion in fiscal year 2020 and may 
decline by as much as $137 billion in 2021. Pandemics are, of course, not 
the only catastrophic risks we may face in coming years. Financial crises, 
natural disasters, social justice crises, and climate change-related 
catastrophes all present serious risks, and often have a compounding effect 
on one another. These risks are especially salient for state and local 
governments, which are at the forefront of crisis response. A government’s 
legitimacy is tested and measured by its ability to respond to these 
challenges, but existing state and local financial frameworks have proven too 
thin and brittle to absorb shocks like COVID-19 or the Financial Crisis of 
2007. This Essay describes how a national resilience fund, with subaccounts 
created for each state and territory, would strengthen the ability of state and 
local governments to respond to crises that will likely arise in the coming 
years. A national resilience fund could be based on a familiar, flexible 
structure that has been used for decades: the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
Such a structure would help insulate the resilience fund from local political 
pressures yet would have the financial strength to help state and local 
governments absorb the costs associated with severe crises such as 
pandemics and natural disasters, thereby helping to preserve the 
government’s legitimacy in times of severe social stress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
COVID-19’s economic impact will reverberate throughout the country 
for years to come. Estimates suggest that global government deficits could 
be as high as $30 trillion by 2023.1 The pandemic has severely impacted 
every state and city in the United States—most importantly through loss of 
life but also through decreased economic prospects. 2  Reduced economic 
activity will negatively impact public services as tax revenues decrease and 
thereby limit state and local governments’ ability to provide their typical 
services including health care, public safety services, and public sector 
 
 1  COVID-19: Briefing Note #10: June 18, 2020, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/covid-19-implications-for-business 
[https://perma.cc/ND5T-F4EC]. As a point of comparison, this was roughly the combined market value 
of all publicly traded U.S. firms at the end of 2018. Total Market Value of U.S. Stock Market, SIBLIS 
RSCH., https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-market-value/ [https://perma.cc/KTR7-P2NX] (reporting 
an approximate value of $30,102,771,200,000). 
 2 This is not to suggest that all countries will suffer from COVID-19 equally, just that all countries 
will experience serious loss as a result of the pandemic. As IMF analyst Gita Gopinath notes: 
This is a truly global crisis as no country is spared. Countries reliant on tourism, travel, hospitality, 
and entertainment for their growth are experiencing particularly large disruptions. Emerging 
market and developing economies face additional challenges with unprecedented reversals in 
capital flows as global risk appetite wanes, and currency pressures, while coping with weaker 
health systems, and more limited fiscal space to provide support. Moreover, several economies 
entered this crisis in a vulnerable state with sluggish growth and high debt levels. 
Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, IMFBLOG 
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-
the-great-depression/ [https://perma.cc/86CH-RETQ]. 
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employment.3 The resulting human costs are difficult to quantify, but are 
clearly not limited to those directly affected by the virus.4 
Pandemics are, of course, not the only catastrophes we will face in the 
coming years. Financial crises, natural disasters, and catastrophic climate 
change-related events all present serious risks.5 These risks are especially 
salient for state and local governments, which are “at the forefront of the 
response . . . in their communities and will likely need to increase their 
typical spending to provide crucial public health services.”6 Austerity is a 
poor plan for long-term economic health, as reduction in services by state 
and local governments can be “a substantial restraint on the vigor of the 
 
 3 It has been suggested that COVID-19 may have a positive effect on climate change due to a 
reduction in pollution associated with decreased economic activity. A study in Nature Climate Change 
suggests that daily fossil CO2 emissions during periods of forced confinement will range from –11% to -
25%. Corinne Le Quéré, Robert B. Jackson, Matthew W. Jones, Adam J.P. Smith, Sam Abernethy, 
Robbie M. Andrew, Anthony J. De-Gol, David R. Willis, Yuli Shan, Josep G. Canadell, Pierre 
Friedlingstein, Felix Creutzig & Glen P. Peters, Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions 
During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 652 (2020). However, 
the study also notes that the “associated annual decrease will be much lower (–4.2 to -7.5% according to 
our sensitivity tests), which is comparable to the rates of decrease needed year-on-year over the next 
decades to limit climate change to a 1.5°C warming.”. Id. Similarly, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) reports reduced economic activity and temporary improvements in air quality in some areas 
resulting from efforts to control the pandemic but persistence of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Climate Change, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-on-climate-change-and-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/SB2W-J235]. The reductions associated with forced confinement have only a limited 
effect on overall atmospheric concentrations of CO2. Id. Additionally, even with the lockdown, CO2 levels 
in the first months of 2020 have been higher than 2019. Id. A rapid restart to the economy may also create 
an emissions spike “unless there is a clear focus to promote equity, environmental health, around a just 
transition to a green economy.” Id. 
 4 In comparison to the Financial Crisis, which resulted in a global reduction of 0.1% in 2009 real 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the “Great Lockdown” is expected to result in a 3% GDP 
reduction, making it the “worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the Global 
Financial Crisis.” Gopinath, supra note 2. And while world economies may recover quickly once the 
pandemic is controlled, the cumulative loss to global GDP in 2020 and 2021 alone may be around $9 
trillion—the approximate size of the economies of Germany and Japan combined. Id.; see also INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: THE GREAT LOCKDOWN 5 (2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020 [https://perma.cc/Z372-9
PMZ] (projecting global growth impacts “far worse than during the 2009 global financial crisis”). 
 5 The winter storm power crisis in Texas highlights these risks and their attendant danger to 
governmental legitimacy. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, A Glimpse of America’s Future: Climate Change 
Means Trouble for Power Grids, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/
climate/texas-power-grid-failures.html [https://perma.cc/3SSP-R7G7] (detailing the risks that climate 
change poses to power grids across the United States). 
 6 Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is COVID-19 Hurting State and Local Revenues?, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/24/how-much-is-covid-
19-hurting-state-and-local-revenues/ [https://perma.cc/N6B6-R4PA]. 
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economic recovery.” 7  As noted in a McKinsey report, during the Great 
Recession: 
Despite enlisting their full arsenal of austerity measures, states were pushed to 
a breaking point by the cumulative burden. . . . Others cut elementary- and 
secondary-education funding by as much as 40 percent, leading many districts 
to reduce the number of school days and furlough employees. Between 2008 
and 2013, state-government workforces were reduced by about 6 percent, and 
the average state-pension funding ratio fell to 75 percent. And, even though the 
federal government injected about $1.3 trillion into the economy as part of the 
largest fiscal recovery plan in US history (at the time), states were still left with 
challenging decisions.8 
Perhaps even more importantly, a reduction in vital services can also expose 
and exacerbate inequality, further eroding confidence in governmental 
institutions and wearing away the government’s legitimacy in a moment 
already fraught with challenges.9 
This Essay sets out the need for a robust public fund to bridge state and 
local financial gaps in times of crisis. Such a tool, operating within a 
federalist framework, would allow states to draw from the fund to meet state 
and local financing needs.10 Part I discusses the importance of maintaining 
 
 7 Id. In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007, instead of attempting to stimulate the economy, 
European countries generally attempted to reduce government spending—implementing strict “austerity” 
policies—that resulted in stunted economic growth and adverse health outcomes. Martin McKee, Marina 
Karanikolos, Paul Belcher & David Stuckler, Austerity: A Failed Experiment on the People of Europe, 
12 CLINICAL MED. 346, 346 (2012); Nadia Daar & Nona Tamale, A Virus of Austerity? The COVID-19 
Spending, Accountability, and Recovery Measures Agreed Between the IMF and Your Government, 
OXFAM INT’L (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.oxfam.org/en/blogs/virus-austerity-covid-19-spending-
accountability-and-recovery-measures-agreed-between-imf-and [https://perma.cc/MCE9-642M]. 
 8 Trey Childress, Ian Jefferson, Aly Spencer & Todd Wintner, The State Transformation Mandate 
During COVID-19, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 15, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-
sector/our-insights/the-state-transformation-mandate-during-covid-19# [https://perma.cc/9G8E-UUXT]. 
 9 As an example, public services spending cuts associated with austerity measures have created 
concerns of a “lost decade” with rising inequality and poverty. TERESA CAVERO & KRISNAH POINASAMY, 
A CAUTIONARY TALE: THE TRUE COST OF AUSTERITY AND INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 3 (2013), 
https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp174-cautionary-tale-austerity-inequality-
europe-120913-en_1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4K-FMY5]. 
 10 There are numerous national funds already managed by the federal government, and some have 
called for a national sovereign development fund. The most thorough and convincing case for such a fund 
is made by Saule Omarova and Robert Hockett. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, 
Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437 (2018) 
(describing and advocating for the creation of a “National Investment Authority”). While a sovereign 
development fund may serve an important role in helping to manage long-term risks and transition costs 
associated with climate change (among other concerns), it would not be as effective in helping to absorb 
short-term systemic shocks. This is because sovereign development funds typically invest in less liquid 
projects such as infrastructure projects. Indeed, the raison d’être of a sovereign development fund is long-
term investment in public-goods projects that tend to not have sufficient private investment interest. See 
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key social services in order to preserve governmental legitimacy, particularly 
in times of crisis. This Part argues first that the ability to manage these crises 
is essential to upholding the social contract. Second, it explains that the high 
probability of future crises necessitates additional financial preparation at the 
federal level through a dedicated public fund. 
In Part II, the Essay describes the various interventions that have been 
used to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic—the most recent 
major test of governmental financial resiliency.11 At the federal level, the 
CARES Act attempted to provide some support to state and local 
governments, and the Federal Reserve and other central banks have also 
established a variety of programs to help support economies during the 
crisis. 12  At the state level, rainy day funds helped manage some of the 
pandemic’s budgetary impacts.13 However, these measures have proven to 
be inadequate. The primary CARES Act support mechanism for state and 
local governments—the Municipal Liquidity Facility—has not operated as 
planned.14 Moreover, most existing state rainy day funds have already been 
drained.15 With the end of the pandemic not yet in sight, more climate and 
public health disasters are sure to come before these funds can be 
replenished. 
Unlike these ad hoc interventions, an ex ante national resilience fund, 
if properly structured, will ensure that resources can be deployed faster than 
through ex post legislation. This would allow state and local governments to 
potentially avoid or minimize some of the risks associated with a major 
catastrophe. Because these funds are established ex ante, they are built into 
the government’s budget structure through the legislative process. 16  By 
contrast, ex post legislation borrows from future generations who do not have 
the ability to vote on the imposition of the debt. 
Part III sketches out the possibility of a national fund and reintroduces 
a proposal modeled after the Unemployment Trust Fund. This fund, which I 
label a “national resilience fund,” would help state and local governments 
 
HÅVARD HALLAND, MICHEL NOËL, SILVANA TORDO & JACOB J. KLOPER-OWENS, STRATEGIC 
INVESTMENT FUNDS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 2, 16–17 (World Bank, Pol’y Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 7851, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235311475681523659/pdf/WPS78
51.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXT2-AHV8]. 
 11 See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text. 
 12 Sheiner & Campbell, supra note 6 (explaining CARES Act funding and the Federal Reserve’s 
Municipal Liquidity Facility). 
 13 See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 54–67 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 16 This point should not diminish the importance of ex ante preparations of other types, including 
investment in, for example, initiatives to reduce inequality or adapt to changing climate conditions. 
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manage severe short-term crises, such as pandemics and natural disasters, by 
providing the financial resources necessary to maintain essential public 
services while responding to the crisis. This assistance has two key benefits. 
First, it helps governments sustain mitigation efforts that may help prevent 
significant future costs. 17  Second, maintenance of services allows 
governments to maintain legitimacy and public trust in times of crisis. 
I. RESILIENCE AND LEGITIMACY 
The government’s authority to govern—and the corresponding 
willingness of the citizenry to obey—is based on “a belief by virtue of which 
persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”18 This belief in government 
authority is premised on both its power to exert that authority, as well as on 
the maintenance of its social contract with citizens.19 The social contract 
implicitly comes with an expectation that the government will exercise its 
authority in a way that secures basic services for its people,20  including 
 
 17 The benefit of early mitigation efforts in a crisis such as a pandemic can be seen with the use of 
the WHO’s “Contingency Fund for Emergencies,” created after the 2014 Ebola crisis. Comparing the 
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which triggered formation of the Contingency Fund for Emergencies 
(CFE), with the 2017 outbreak in Congo the CFE subsequently helped to manage, the WHO states: 
The contrast between the 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreak and the 2014 
West Africa Ebola epidemic is stark. The former claimed four lives, lasted two months, and cost 
US [$]2 million to contain. The latter claimed more than 11 000 lives over almost two years, at a 
cost of more than US [$]3.6 billion. Clearly no single factor can account for such a vast disparity 
in mortality and morbidity between two outbreaks. But equally, there can be no doubt that the 
speed of the response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the decisive factor in the swift 
containment of the outbreak — something that would simply not have been possible without the 
CFE. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONTINGENCY FUND FOR EMERGENCIES: ENABLING QUICK ACTION TO SAVE 
LIVES 5 (2018), https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contributions/cfe-impact-report-web2018.pdf
?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/TFX4-YXGW]. 
 18 MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 382 (Talcott Parsons ed., 
A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 2009); see also Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STAN. 
ENCYC. PHIL. (Apr. 24, 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/2HQ2-
6K2C] (explaining some of the various conceptions of, and debates surrounding, political legitimacy). 
 19 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (discussing the structure 
of society and idea of a legitimate government under a social contract theory). A social contract theory 
was articulated by Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 work Leviathan and has been expanded and debated by 
political philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls among many others. Fred D’Agostino, 
Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. 
(May 31, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ [https://perma.cc/5W
7P-MY5H]. 
 20 See WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017: GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW 31 
(2017) (“When a government repeatedly delivers on its commitments, it legitimizes itself, such as by 
reliably providing public services.”). 
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services supporting social order.21 As described by Clark and Monk, “state 
legitimacy depends upon the extent to which government meets the 
fundamental interests of its citizens, and the extent to which it can claim a 
sphere of autonomy.”22 In order to maintain legitimacy with its citizens, it is 
pivotal that a government be able to provide key services during crises, 
during which an extensive use of government resources—including direct 
health care, medical equipment, and health infrastructure—is especially 
required to develop long-term solutions to the crisis. A natural disaster, for 
example, requires resources and coordination to reestablish “community 
lifelines,” including food, clean water, and medical care.23 By contrast, when 
the government fails to provide that “fundamental interest” and is perceived 
as illegitimate, societies frayed by pandemics or racial injustice may 
completely unravel.24 
Crises—even pandemics, which by definition affect societies around 
the world—typically require extensive local and state management. While 
the legitimacy of the federal government may be impacted by its response to 
crises, state and local governments typically shoulder the burden of disaster 
with the federal government providing a supporting role. As described by 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
Disasters always occur at the local level. For some types of natural disasters, 
like slow rising floods or approaching hurricanes, warning is available. Other 
disasters, like earthquakes, happen with little or no warning. The citizens in the 
area where the event occurs and their local governments and voluntary agencies 
are the first to have to cope with the damage.25 
 
 21 Philip Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 59, 
65 (2012). 
 22  Gordon L. Clark & Ashby Monk, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC): 
Insurer of Last Resort and Bulwark of Nation-State Legitimacy, 23 PAC. REV. 429, 431 (2010). 
 23 Under the National Response Framework, providing community lifelines ensures “continuous 
operation of critical government and business functions and is essential to human health and safety or 
economic security.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 8 (4th ed. 
2019). Community lifelines include safety and security; food, water, shelter; health and medical services; 
energy (power & fuel); communications; transportation; and hazardous material. Id. 
 24  The protests following the killing of George Floyd illustrate this fraying of American 
governmental legitimacy. As discussed by Patrick Eddington, “the longstanding and ongoing targeting of 
[B]lack Americans by that still white‐dominated power structure . . . has brought the country to a place 
where people of color increasingly see American governmental institutions as corrupt, unaccountably 
violent, and thus illegitimate.” Patrick G. Eddington, Race, Violence, and Political Illegitimacy, 
DEFENDING RTS. & DISSENT (June 10, 2020), https://rightsanddissent.org/news/race-violence-and-
political-illegitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/F9JQ-YH57]. 
 25 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT COURSE – IS 208, at 3.4, 
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is208sdmunit3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9E9-6PCM]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
48 
However, local governments typically cannot marshal the resources 
necessary to manage catastrophes such as pandemics and natural disasters.26 
Furthermore, local governments usually cannot directly access federal 
programs. 27  State governments are essential intermediaries between the 
federal and local governments; they are large enough to marshal resources 
but also more localized and responsive to local needs, more knowledgeable 
of available local resources, and arguably more accountable to local voters 
than federal governments. As noted by James Madison in Federalist No. 45, 
this notion of state control is grounded in the American federalist system, in 
which “[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the 
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, 
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State.” 28  Because of this federal system—and the 
supporting role that FEMA and other government agencies provide in times 
of severe crisis—the federal government’s legitimacy is inextricably linked 
to the operation and resiliency of state and local governments. 
That local, state, and federal governmental legitimacy will be tested in 
the coming years is underscored by four current intersecting crises: the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the racial justice crisis, economic dislocation due to 
globalization, and the climate crisis. All of these crises are expected to 
continue and even worsen,29 resulting in major societal impacts that will 
require strong responses and transformative efforts at both the state and local 
levels. 
Future crises may not be entirely predictable in both timing and 
magnitude, but pandemics, economic crises, and climate-related disasters are 
nonetheless highly probable events.30 The current COVID-19 pandemic and 
 
 26 See infra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
 27 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 25, at 3.6. 
 28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 29 See, e.g., Henry Fountain, Climate Change Is Accelerating, Bringing World ‘Dangerously Close’ 
to Irreversible Change, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/
climate-change-acceleration.html [https://perma.cc/FA2R-WYYW] (describing how the climate crisis 
will continue to worsen); Nina Lakhani, Killer Heat: US Racial Injustices Will Worsen as Climate Crisis 
Escalates, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/28/us-
racial-injustices-will-worsen-climate-crisis-escalates [https://perma.cc/5FUG-2HN8]. 
 30 For example, noting at least two influenza pandemics in each of the past three centuries, Hill, 
Tildesley, and House argue that “[b]eing prepared to experience several pandemics a century could ensure 
a quicker, cheaper and more efficient response to the threat posed by this disease.” Edward Hill, Michael 
Tildesley & Thomas House, How Predictable Are Flu Pandemics?, 14 SIGNIFICANCE 28, 29 tbl.1, 33 
(2017). Similarly, historical evidence suggests that the economic system is “vulnerable to predictable 
boom-bust cycles driven by credit expansion and asset price growth.” Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. 
Hanson, Andrei Shleifer & Jakob Ahm Sørensen, Predictable Financial Crises 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27396, 2020). As a result, the authors argue that “policymakers should consider 
prophylactic policy interventions that lean against the wind.” Id. 
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climate-related crises provide evidence of both the probability of future 
crises as well as evidence of the ways in which these crises challenge 
government legitimacy, especially when basic services that protect citizen 
health and safety are in short supply. 
For example, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s concerns about the 
city’s ability to provide basic services threatened city government 
legitimacy. De Blasio stated that given the likely $10 billion deficit related 
to COVID-19 in New York’s budget over 2020 and 2021, New York City 
would not be able to “provide basic services and actually have a normal 
society.” 31  De Blasio’s initial handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has 
drawn sharp criticism from New Yorkers and onlookers alike who question 
whether the city’s government was equipped to handle such a crisis.32 
Another example can be drawn from the recent fires in California. 
Despite extensive local government preparation for wildfires, the state 
government of California had to request additional emergency resources 
from other states and the federal government during this past year’s 
catastrophic fires.33 The strain on California’s mutual aid system resulting 
from the fires made it difficult for state and local governments to get 
firefighting resources, both in- and out-of-state, to fight the fires.34 
It is the high probability of future crises that justifies planning and 
mitigation and distinguishes them from “Black Swan” events, a term 
popularized by Nassim Nicholas Taleb intended to refer to outlier events for 
which no government could plan.35 Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic, while 
 
 31 Sarah Hansen, Coronavirus Crisis Has Cost NYC up to $10 Billion: ‘Basic Services’ at Risk as De 
Blasio Pleads for More Federal Aid, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
sarahhansen/2020/04/15/coronavirus-crisis-has-cost-nyc-up-to-10-billion-basic-services-at-risk-as-de-
blasio-pleads-for-more-federal-aid/?sh=5892e67647a1 [https://perma.cc/68WY-B2B2]. 
 32 See David Freedlander, When New York Needed Him Most, Bill De Blasio Had His Worst Week 
as Mayor, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/bill-
de-blasio-had-his-worst-week-as-new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/S6TN-UDNB]; Charles 
Duhigg, Seattle’s Leaders Let Scientists Take the Lead. New York’s Did Not, NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/04/seattles-leaders-let-scientists-take-the-lead-
new-yorks-did-not [https://perma.cc/2FML-E5AH]; Jeffery C. Mays & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor 
Resisted Drastic Steps on Virus. Then Came a Backlash from His Aides., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/nyregion/coronavirus-bill-de-blasio.html [https://perma.cc/3AYA
-N7QJ]. 
 33 See Taryn Luna, California Firefighting Resources ‘Stretched’ by 23 Major Wildfires, Newsom 
Says, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2020, 8:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-19/
california-resources-stretched-23-wildfires [https://perma.cc/S9PU-VV3H]. 
 34 Id. 
 35 In his 2007 book The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb popularized the term “Black Swan 
event,” which refers to a catastrophic event with three key attributes: 
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certainly a catastrophe by any calculation, was not an unpredictable event.36 
The risk of a global pandemic was not only contemplated; it was expected.37 
As a New Yorker article put it, the pandemic was “wholly predictable—
[Taleb], like Bill Gates, Laurie Garrett, and others, had predicted it—a white 
swan if ever there was one.”38 
When governments face crises such as climate-related disasters, 
societal upheavals in response to injustice, pandemics, and economic 
dislocation, they will need to be financially prepared to quickly and 
effectively mitigate negative impacts. A resilience fund may, like other types 
of reserve funds, function as a “bulwark of nation-state legitimacy”39 by 
enabling a state to insulate itself against economic instability, in key part by 
bridging existing rifts and chasms between federal, state, and local resources 
and responses. Moreover, as these events often have compounding effects 
that reinforce and exacerbate one another, the need for a more resilient public 
finance structure has never been greater. 
II. FINANCING CRISIS RELIEF 
At the core of any successful crisis response, whether to a pandemic, a 
natural disaster, or an economic crisis, is a robust legal and financial 
framework that can quickly deploy funds to support relief efforts and rebuild 
the economic infrastructure.40 This Part first describes some of the federal 
interventions used to mitigate catastrophes affecting state and local 
governments. It also explains why these interventions have largely been 
inadequate for COVID-19’s demands and will likely be inadequate in the 
 
First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the 
past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact . . . . Third, in 
spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the 
fact, making it explainable and predictable. 
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xxii (2d ed. 
2010). 
 36 Bernard Avishai, The Pandemic Isn’t a Black Swan but a Portent of a More Fragile Global System, 
NEW YORKER: DAILY COMMENT (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the
-pandemic-isnt-a-black-swan-but-a-portent-of-a-more-fragile-global-system [https://perma.cc/9VAC-
6XK5] (quoting Taleb from an interview in which he stated, “[w]e issued our warning that, effectively, 
you should kill [COVID-19] in the egg”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Clark & Monk, supra note 22. 
 40 See, e.g., Dalvinder Singh & John Raymond LaBrosse, Developing a Framework for Effective 
Financial Crisis Management, 2011 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 125, 129–30 (2012) (noting that, for 
example, a central bank must provide liquidity “decisively and quickly without hesitation, otherwise a 
panic could be prolonged and spread into other parts of the financial system which were unaffected by 
the original problem”). 
116:41 (2021) Toward a National Resilience Fund 
51 
face of expected future catastrophes. Second, this Part details state “rainy 
day funds” and why they are also insufficient in the face of a widescale crisis. 
A. Federal Interventions 
Federal crisis interventions are primarily ad hoc efforts that may not 
occur until weeks or even months after a crisis. The federal financial 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic provides a lens through which we can 
examine a typical ad hoc federal crisis response. Comparatively, the federal 
response to COVID-19 was relatively swift. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act (CARES Act),41 which was enacted on March 
27, 2020, included numerous provisions to help both individuals and 
businesses during the early stages of the pandemic. Although the CARES 
Act arrived in an unusually timely fashion,42 its primary problem was that it 
did not sufficiently support state and local budgets. Additional federal 
assistance through the Federal Reserve, while important, also proved to be 
inadequate support at the state and local level. 
The CARES Act provided small business interruption loans of up to 
$10 million, the proceeds of which could be used for payroll support 
(including paid sick, medical, or family leave, and group health care benefit 
costs), employee salaries, rent or mortgage payments, utilities, and existing 
debt obligations.43 The Act also provided “recovery rebates” for individual 
tax filers 44  with an estimated average payout of $1,523. 45  The Act also 
contained, among other things, provisions designed to reduce or delay 
 
 41 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) 
[hereinafter CARES Act]. 
 42 Even the CARES Act, which was passed fairly quickly, was not signed into law until nearly two 
weeks after President Donald Trump declared the pandemic a national emergency. A Timeline of COVID-
19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-
timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/DP46-L6MB]. Some government 
programs are designed to provide a more rapid response, such as the Disaster Relief Fund, which as of 
the end of fiscal year 2019 carried a balance of $29 billion. WILLIAM L. PAINTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R45484, THE DISASTER RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES ii (2020). However, this too is an 
inadequate resource. Designed to help manage the costs of natural disasters, it is often dwarfed by yearly 
cyclone costs alone, which average $21.5 billion in damage for each event. Fast Facts: Hurricane Costs, 
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-
facts/hurricane-costs.html [https://perma.cc/CCJ6-47JV]. Unlike the Disaster Relief Fund, however, the 
fund proposed here would not be circumscribed by a narrow definition of “disaster” as a natural 
catastrophe and would not be subject to a presidential determination of an emergency. 
 43 CARES Act § 1102(a). 
 44 CARES Act § 2201. 
 45 Garrett Watson, Taylor LaJoie, Huaqun Li & Daniel Bunn, Congress Approves Economic Relief 
Plan for Individuals and Businesses, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/cares-act-
senate-coronavirus-bill-economic-relief-plan/ [https://perma.cc/W2BW-6EE4]. 
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business taxes 46  and personal taxes, 47  provisions to manage medical 
equipment and drug supplies, 48  and provisions for “severely distressed 
sectors”—passenger air carriers, cargo air carriers, and other businesses 
which incurred losses to the point that continued operations were 
“jeopardized.”49 
As previously noted, however, the ex post CARES Act did not 
adequately support state and local budgets and may have a long-term impact 
on the U.S. economy. For one, as in the 2007 Financial Crisis,50 the bailouts 
for severely distressed businesses came with strings attached: the Secretary 
of the Treasury was authorized by the legislation to enter into contracts with 
businesses receiving funding through the loan program so that, depending on 
the financial success of the eligible business, the government could aid in the 
business’s further gains through various mechanisms such as warrants, stock 
options, and common or preferred stock.51 These “strings” thus cut into state 
and local business profits during a time when local economies were already 
deeply hurting. Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
the previously unplanned-for allocation of federal funds through the CARES 
Act will increase federal deficits by about $1.7 trillion over the 2020–2030 
period, with a $988 billion increase in mandatory expenditures under the Act, 
a $408 billion decrease in revenues, and a $326 billion increase in 
“discretionary” expenditures.52 Together, these effects may have a long-term 
impact on the health of the U.S. economy. 
 
 46 CARES Act §§ 2301–2308. 
 47 CARES Act § 2102. 
 48 CARES Act § 3102. 
 49 CARES Act § 4003. 
 50 In the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Treasury was authorized to purchase 
“troubled asset[s]” from publicly traded financial institutions on the condition that Treasury receive “a 
warrant giving the right to the Secretary to receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock in such 
financial institution.” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 § 113(d)(1). The purpose of the requirement was to “provide for reasonable participation by the 
Secretary, for the benefit of taxpayers, in equity appreciation in the case of a warrant or other equity 
security, or a reasonable interest rate premium, in the case of a debt instrument,” and to “provide 
additional protection for the taxpayer against losses from sale of assets by the Secretary under this Act 
and the administrative expenses of the TARP.” Id. § 113(d)(2). 
 51 CARES Act § 3102(d)(2). 
 52 Letter from Phillip L. Swagel, Director, Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Budget 1–2 (Apr. 27, 2020). The Act provided for expenditures of over $2 trillion, but the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) notes: 
[T]he projected cost is less than [$2 trillion] because some of that assistance is in the form of loan 
guarantees, which are not estimated to have a net effect on the budget. In particular, the act 
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to provide up to $454 billion to fund emergency lending 
facilities established by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Because the 
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In addition to interventions like the CARES Act, current federal 
monetary policy can also play an important—though incomplete—role in 
managing widescale crises. The Federal Reserve has assisted in the COVID-
19 response through a wide variety of ad hoc mechanisms. These 
mechanisms include cutting the target for the federal funds rate to 0% from 
0.25% (which helps reduce borrowing costs for mortgages, car loans, student 
loans, and other types of debt); purchasing securities in the market 
(hearkening back to the “quantitative easing” strategies employed during the 
2007 Financial Crisis, in which the Fed purchased trillions in securities such 
as mortgage-backed instruments); 53  securities lending; supporting money 
market mutual funds; and direct lending to financial institutions, major 
employers, and state and municipal governments.54 Such mechanisms are 
designed to alleviate financial and economic pressures by providing capital 
and liquidity that sustain financially stressed businesses during widescale 
crises. 
The Federal Reserve has also attempted to help local governments more 
directly through the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), a funding 
mechanism established by the CARES Act to help provide liquidity to state 
and local governments affected by the COVID-19 crisis. 55  Under the 
program, the facility is available to any state or city with more than 250,000 
residents or county with more than 500,000 residents with a strong credit 
rating.56 The program provides up to $500 billion in funding through the 
purchase of short-term debt.57 The debt is priced by reference to a floating 
rate in addition to a “fixed spread” derived from the debt’s rating.58 Debt 
proceeds must be used to help manage liquidity problems arising from 
COVID-19, including cash flow effects resulting from deferred tax filings.59 
Nevertheless, by November 30, 2020, the MLF was primarily utilized 
by only two issuers, the state of Illinois and the New York Metropolitan 
 
income and costs stemming from that lending are expected to roughly offset each other, CBO 
estimates no deficit effect from that provision. 
Id. at 2. 
 53  BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43413, COSTS OF GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A RETROSPECTIVE 32 (2018). 
 54 For a summary of the Federal Reserve’s efforts, see Jeffrey Cheng, Tyler Powell, Dave Skidmore 
& David Wessel, What’s the Fed Doing in Response to the COVID-19 Crisis? What More Could It Do?, 
BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/fed-response-to-covid19/ [https://
perma.cc/5XRL-S7LZ]. 
 55 Id. 
 56  FAQs: Municipal Liquidity Facility, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/municipal-liquidity-facility/municipal-liquidity-facility-faq [https://perma.cc/E8CP-9E4R]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
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Transportation Authority60 and for relatively small amounts totaling only 
$1.65 billion.61  The Federal Reserve viewed the program primarily as a 
mechanism to reassure investors who would be “comforted that the Fed was 
standing by to meet the liquidity needs of state and local governments.”62 
The program’s critics, however, argue that it was too restrictive, with eligible 
issuers generally limited to large cities and counties.63 Issuers also reportedly 
found the interest rates set by the Federal Reserve to be unattractively high—
with one estimate suggesting 97% of eligible cities, counties, and states 
could be functionally excluded from the program because of pricing64—and 
the maximum debt maturity to be unattractively short.65 The MLF was also 
a fairly short-term program with the Federal Reserve buying state and local 
debt instruments only up to December 31, 2020.66 Ultimately, while federal 
financial support during the COVID-19 pandemic has been deeply needed, 
federal efforts have proved to be insufficient: state and local governments 
“have been battered by pandemic-related costs and collapsing tax revenues, 
 
 60 Colby Smith & Brooke Fox, US Businesses Race to Tap Fed Lending Before Year-End Expiry, 
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/c9cd9a01-4cbe-45e4-b369-ee796f11730e 
[https://perma.cc/7KEJ-F4X5]; Yvette Shields, Illinois Pockets $2 Billion Fed Municipal Liquidity 
Facility Loan, BOND BUYER (Dec. 18, 2020, 8:09 AM), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/illinois-
pockets-2b-fed-mlf-loan [https://perma.cc/Q3XA-M7UK]. 
 61  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING 
LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
6 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-pmccf-smccf-talf-mlf-
ppplf-msnlf-mself-msplf-nonlf-noelf-12-11-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EFL-L4R9]. The facility was 
reportedly used again at the end of its expiry date for a total of $6.4 billion. Smith & Fox, supra note 60. 
 62 Sarah Wynn, Disagreement on the Role of the Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility, BOND BUYER 
(Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/disagreement-on-the-role-of-the-feds-municipal-
liquidity-facility [https://perma.cc/5EGT-RB37]. 
 63  POPULAR DEMOCRACY, AIMING TO UNDERACHIEVE: HOW A FEDERAL RESERVE LENDING 
PROGRAM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IS DESIGNED TO FALL SHORT 2 (2020), 
https://www.populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Aiming%20to%20Underachieve%20-%20Fed
%20Up%20White%20Paper%20June%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH7N-LF8U]. 
 64 Id. at 3. 
 65 Id. at 6. 
 66 FAQs: Municipal Liquidity Facility, supra note 56. Other criticisms include concerns that the 
program represents a misallocation of credit, with the Federal Reserve 
reallocate[ing] purchasing power away from other entities in the market to those whose bonds the 
Fed purchases. The cost to society is the difference between the value of the projects pursued by 
state and local government with those resources and the value of the projects other entities could 
have pursued with those same resources. 
Alexander William Salter, The Fed’s State and Municipal Lending Is a Bad Idea, HILL (June 12, 2020, 
8:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/502505-the-feds-state-and-municipal-lending-is-a-bad-
idea [https://perma.cc/U56M-8FGX]. 
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[and] have already cut more than 1.3 million jobs.”67 Indeed, even the $900 
billion relief package proposed in December 2020 would not be enough to 
support people until the economy rebounds, as is expected to happen after 
the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.68 
Finally, emergency federal support through deficit spending, like the 
CARES Act and Federal Reserve mechanisms, has another flaw. Unless 
funds are set aside for moments of crisis, emergency appropriations typically 
borrow from the future (and future generations) to pay for present expenses.69 
With deficit spending, future generations inherit a burden without having had 
the opportunity to vote on and approve it. By contrast, the resilience fund 
described below borrows from the present (and current taxpayers) to pay for 
future expenses. Therefore, with respect to intergenerational justice, a 
resilience fund creates a more just option than deficit spending in the sense 
that the polity is able to vote on and approve or disapprove of measures that 
limit current expenditures. 
B. State Rainy Day Funds 
Unfortunately, states have limited options to mitigate problems arising 
from budget shortfalls70  and, like federal efforts, these options are often 
insufficient in the face of large-scale crises. States can reduce spending 
where possible and may also raise taxes. However, these are “procyclical 
policies that not only disrupt public services and increase taxpayers’ burden, 
but also worsen recessions and slow economic recoveries.” 71  Moreover, 
because demand for many of the costliest public services, such as education 
and social services, is fixed and inelastic, states may be limited in their ability 
to significantly reduce spending without dramatically limiting services 
through layoffs or other draconian measures.72 
 
 67 Jim Tankersley & Ben Casselman, A $900 Billion Plan Would Help the Economy, but Not Fix It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/business/economy/congress-stimulus
-economy-impact.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/X9TJ-LABR]. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Deficit spending, by definition, means that the costs of legislation are not covered by existing tax 
revenues. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates the deficit impact of legislation 
related to COVID-19 to be about $3.4 trillion. Breaking Down $3.4 Trillion in COVID Relief, COMM. 
FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/breaking-down-3-4-trillion
-covid-relief [https://perma.cc/UD5U-Y3UX]. 
 70  Bo Zhao, Saving for a Rainy Day: Estimating the Appropriate Size of U.S. State Budget 
Stabilization Funds 1 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014), https://www.
bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/wp1412.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTR7-FNAQ]. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Bo Zhao & David Coyne, Walking a Tightrope: Are U.S. State and Local Governments on a 
Fiscally Sustainable Path? 1–2, 15, 31 tbl.3 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 13-18, 2013), 
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In addition to their limited ability to reduce spending, states also have a 
limited ability to maintain services through deficit spending. Almost all 
states have balanced budget amendments which prohibit state governments 
from going into debt to finance government expenditures.73 Further, political 
expediency may compel state governments to establish balanced budgets to 
determine political survival. Governors and legislators cannot successfully 
run for reelection with a budget in deficit.74 Crises also tend to have powerful 
countercyclical effects: not only do revenues decrease, but service demands 
also rise with the decrease in revenues and resources.75 State tax structures 
exacerbate this effect as states are increasingly relying “on narrower, and 
often more elastic tax basis such as personal income, and higher nominal 
rates.”76 
Local governments are also limited in the ways in which they can raise 
revenue and cut spending in the event of a crisis requiring significant 
economic resources. Because states have taken on greater responsibility for 
funding high-cost social services like health care, state budget gaps may lead 




(finding evidence that education, social services and income maintenance, public safety, transportation, 
and government administration expenditures “are income inelastic and that they are necessary goods for 
the public”). 
 73 The exact number is debatable, depending on how explicit one reads the applicable amendment or 
statutory provision: 
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has traditionally reported that 49 states 
must balance their budgets, with Vermont being the exception. Other authorities add Wyoming 
and North Dakota as exceptions, and some authorities in Alaska contend that it does not have an 
explicit requirement for a balanced budget. Two points can be made with certainty, however: 
Most states have formal balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state 
political cultures reinforce the requirements. 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2 
(2010), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7LQQ-SSFS]. 
 74 Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, Rainy Day Funds and Value at Risk, STATE TAX NOTES 563, 
563 (2003), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/58781/1000606-Rainy-Day-Funds-and
-Value-at-Risk.PDF [https://perma.cc/9T3T-CUCJ]. 
 75 Richard Mattoon, Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve State 
Fiscal Performance 4 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2003-20, 2003), https://www.
chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2003/wp2003-20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3VJC-MPFH]. 
 76  Id. Mattoon notes that states appear “reluctant to ‘fix’ their tax structures to better manage 
volatility. In addition, it is unclear that revenue volatility is necessarily a bad thing if states are willing to 
create budget stabilization tools. Efforts to broaden major tax bases, such as subjecting services to sales 
taxation, have seen little progress.” Id. 
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programs or, when possible, by increasing taxes. 77  Local governments, 
however, face funding challenges created by state limitations on their ability 
to raise revenue. Forty-two states place limitations on local governments’ 
property tax powers, and “the number of restrictions has expanded 
extensively since [the] 1990s.”78 Local governments also have increasing 
federal and state mandates, which are not adequately funded through federal 
and state aid, to provide services ranging from “criminal justice and public 
safety, health and human services, transportation and infrastructure, to 
administration of elections and property assessments.” 79  Thus, like state 
governments, local governments have relatively inelastic budgets. 
In the face of rising costs and limited options for increasing revenues, 
almost all U.S. states have set up “rainy day funds” to help balance their 
budgets in the event of a shortfall.80 Prior to COVID-19, state funds had 
reached a record $74.9 billion in budget reserves.81 A Pew study estimates 
that states could have continued government operations on these funds for a 
median of 27.9 days (equivalent to 7.7% of total annual spending).82 The 
insufficiency of rainy day funds is apparent from two crises in the past fifteen 
years: the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 and the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic. 
State governments suffered a shortfall of approximately $690 billion in 
the five years following the Financial Crisis. 83  Some states made 
considerable use of those funds during the Financial Crisis and the “Great 
Recession” that followed. According to Marlowe, “rainy day funds have 
 
 77  See State and Local Finance Expenditures, URBAN INST., https://www.urban.org/policy-
centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-
and-local-expenditures [https://perma.cc/L4U8-SUHU] (showing public welfare spending, including 
Medicaid spending, rising from 13% of state and local spending in 1977 to 22% in 2017). 
 78 JOEL GRIFFITH, JONATHAN HARRIS & EMILIA ISTRATE, DOING MORE WITH LESS: STATE REVENUE 
LIMITATIONS & MANDATES ON COUNTY FINANCES 1 (Nat’l Ass’n of Counties Pol’y Rsch. Paper Series 
Issue 5, 2016), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Doing%20More%20with%20Less_
Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2C9-36KK]. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Barb Rosewicz, Justin Theal & Joe Fleming, States’ Financial Reserves Hit Record Highs, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/
2020/03/18/states-financial-reserves-hit-record-highs [https://perma.cc/G59A-8587]. The authors note 
that “[s]tates use reserves and balances to manage budgetary uncertainty, including revenue forecasting 
errors, budget gaps during economic downturns, and other unforeseen emergencies, such as natural 
disasters. This financial cushion can soften the need for severe spending cuts or tax increases when states 
need to balance their budgets.” Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Childress et al., supra note 8 (citing ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, MICHAEL LEACHMAN & JOSHUAH 
MARSHALL, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES NEED SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FISCAL RELIEF 
TO SLOW THE EMERGING DEEP RECESSION 12–13 (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/4-14-20sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ3A-Z6TD]). 
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been the best (and in some cases the only) tool” for states in mending the 
destruction of states’ economies following the Great Recession.84 As noted 
in a McKinsey report, however, “[t]wenty-eight states drained their rainy-
day funds to a point where they had less than a week’s worth of operating 
costs; 17 used them entirely.”85 For other states, flaws in the design of their 
rainy day funds discouraged the use of the funds, despite the severity of the 
crisis. Missouri’s constitution, for example, requires that any withdrawals 
from the state rainy day fund be paid back within three years, with interest, 
and that the state must redeposit in each of those years at least a third of the 
amount withdrawn.86 As a result, states saw significant reductions in health, 
education, and other social services from the Financial Crisis.87 With the 
COVID-19 pandemic coming soon after, states were again pushed to the 
brink. 
Given the severity of COVID-19’s financial implications, states were 
faced with a clear need to draw down on their rainy day funds. In Ohio, for 
example, the state’s rainy day fund provided the state with “financial 
firepower to withstand the fiscal assault brought on by COVID-19,” and, 
because of the fund, the state did not have to rely on tax increases or federal 
loans to cover the expenses.88 As with the Financial Crisis, however, the 
funds’ limited sizes have hampered their effectiveness. As shown in the 
graphs below,89 funds from state rainy day funds cover only about 8.5% of 
states’ fiscal needs in aggregate. While rainy day funds were at historically 
high levels prior to the COVID-19 crisis, most (if not all) do not have 
sufficient funding to help states cover the losses from 2020—let alone the 
 
 84  Justin Marlowe, What’s the Point of Rainy Day Funds?, GOVERNING (June 2013), 
https://www.governing.com/archive/colpoint-of-rainy-day-funds.html [https://perma.cc/BRM6-YZRJ]. 
 85 Childress et al., supra note 8. 
 86 STEPHEN BAILEY, BRENNA ERFORD, KIL HUH, AKSHAY IYENGAR, AIRLIE LOIACONI, PATRICK 
MURRAY, ROBERT ZAHRADNIK & ALEXANDRIA ZHANG, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., WHEN TO USE STATE 
RAINY DAY FUNDS: WITHDRAWAL POLICIES TO MITIGATE VOLATILITY AND PROMOTE STRUCTURALLY 
BALANCED BUDGETS 12–13 (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/04/when-to-use-
state-rainy-day-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AAU-HZLA]. 
 87 In response to the 2007 Financial Crisis, “[m]ost states cut spending.” Tracy Gordon, State and 
Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/
articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/US94-M9KX]. Cuts fell 
predominantly in education, health, and social services, where states also dedicate most of their budgets. 
Id. 
 88  THE BUCKEYE INST., POLICY MEMO: USING THE RAINY DAY FUND TO FIGHT COVID-19’S 
IMPACT 1 (2020), https://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/library/docLib/2020-04-15-The-Buckeye-Institute-
Strategic-Use-of-Ohio-s-Rainy-Day-Fund-Along-with-Budget-Cuts-Would-Avoid-Tax-Increases-
policy-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD8L-7YKP]. 
 89 See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 67 tbl.25, 69 
figs.4 & 5 (2019), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-b750-
0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Fiscal%20Survey/NASBO_Fall_2019_Fiscal_Survey_of_States_S.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/236E-DQDX]. 
116:41 (2021) Toward a National Resilience Fund 
59 
expected downturns in 2021 and beyond. Indeed, ten states tapped their rainy 
day funds within the first few months of the crisis. Some states’ rainy day 
funds were so scant “that, even if they were entirely drained, there wouldn’t 
be enough cash to help the states through a fine mist, much less a rainy 
day.”90 Nevada, for example, quickly used all of the $401 million in its rainy 
day fund to help cover the shortfall resulting from the pandemic, which for 
fiscal year 2020 alone is expected to range from $741 million to $911 
million.91 
FIGURE 1: U.S. STATE RAINY DAY FUND BALANCES (BILLIONS) 
  
 
 90 Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, The Draining of State Rainy Day Funds, ROUTE FIFTY (Oct. 
13, 2020), https://www.route-fifty.com/finance/2020/10/draining-state-rainy-day-funds/169194/ [https://
perma.cc/4H8Q-6NLU]. 
 91 Board Drains Nevada’s Rainy Day Fund to Deal with Pandemic Financial Crisis, NEV. APPEAL 
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FIGURE 2: U.S. STATE RAINY DAY FUND BALANCES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
 
In an extensive review of the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on state 
and local budgets, taking into account the mitigating effect of state rainy day 
funds, a Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland study suggests that income and 
sales revenues will decline by $54 billion in fiscal year 2020.92 An additional 
$25 billion to $137 billion in revenue may be lost, depending on the speed 
of the recovery.93 Rainy day funds may reduce the loss to $21 billion in 2020 
and $4 billion to $78 billion in 2021.94 State rainy day funds thus provide 
significant mitigation, but not nearly enough to stave off a substantial 
diminution in essential governmental services. 
In sum, the federal responses to COVID-19 and the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008 revealed that the federal government’s crisis efforts are slow and 
inefficient at responding to local needs. Additionally, in the case of dramatic, 
large-scale crises like pandemics, national resources may also be 
insufficient. State rainy day funds may fill some gaps, but they are too small 
in size and are subject to political calculations that make it less likely that 
they would be used to manage crises in their early stages. 
 
 92 STEPHAN D. WHITAKER, FED. RSRV. BANK OF CLEVELAND, ESTIMATES OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE LOSSES FROM PANDEMIC MITIGATION 1 (2020), https://www.clevelandfed.org/
newsroom-and-events/publications/cfed-district-data-briefs/cfddb-20200513-estimates-of-state-and-
local-government-revenue-losses-from-pandemic-mitigation.aspx [https://perma.cc/4VT6-KCQ5]. 
 93 Id. 
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III. DEVELOPING A NATIONAL RESILIENCE FUND 
In a moment characterized by compounding crises and inadequate 
financial tools at every level, something more is needed. A resilience fund 
would go far in filling this gap. This Part describes how a national resilience 
fund, with subaccounts created for each state and territory, would help state 
and local governments respond to the crises that are likely to arise in the 
coming years. A national resilience fund could be based on a familiar, 
flexible structure that has already been in use for decades: the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. 95  Such a structure would help insulate the 
resilience fund from local political pressures. It would also have the financial 
strength to help state and local governments absorb the costs associated with 
severe crises such as pandemics and natural disasters, thereby helping to 
preserve governmental legitimacy in times of severe social stress. 
A. Building a National Resilience Fund 
The concept of a national-level stabilization fund, designed to alleviate 
budget crises similar to the resilience fund proposed here, has been in use for 
decades in other countries. As with a resilience fund, governments use 
budget stabilization-oriented funds to help manage unexpected economic 
downturns.96 In the United States, the notion of creating a national fund that 
could absorb state and local budgetary shocks also has some precedent. In a 
2003 publication, for example, Federal Reserve economist Richard Mattoon 
suggested a federal version of a rainy day fund, with separate subaccounts 
for each state, that could be deployed to respond to larger crises that current 
rainy day funds cannot manage.97 
Mattoon identified a number of justifications for a national fund as 
opposed to simply increasing funding for state rainy day funds.98 The politics 
of rainy day funds, for example, present significant barriers to expanding 
existing state funds.99 A number of states already have relatively low caps on 
the amount of money that may be reserved in the rainy day fund; of the forty-
one states with caps, nine restrict the fund to 5% or less of the state’s total 
expenditures or revenues.100 Because the funds are typically part of the state 
 
 95 See infra Section III.A.1. 
 96 See, e.g., Xie Ping & Chen Chao, The Theoretical Logic of Sovereign Wealth Funds 24 (June 16, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1420618 [https://perma.cc/X7T4-SZN5] 
(describing the use of sovereign wealth funds as, among other things, budget stabilization mechanisms). 
 97 See Mattoon, supra note 75, at 4. 
 98 Id. at 3–4. 
 99 Id. at 3. 
 100  TAX POL’Y CTR., BRIEFING BOOK 668 (2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/
files/briefing-book/tpc_briefing_book_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPX8-REM9]. 
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constitution, increasing the fund’s limits may require a change to the state 
constitution and would necessitate either an increase in tax or a decrease in 
services. 101  With state budgets already struggling to meet current 
expenditures and facing budgetary headwinds as they move into the future,102 
it seems unlikely that states could muster the political will to set aside funds 
that would otherwise be used on existing needs to prepare for future 
challenges. Such existing needs include dramatic increases in state Medicaid 
spending, which is now the greatest expense after K–12 education. 103 
Additionally, pension costs also create significant challenges for state 
budgets. Unfunded pension benefits were the “most prominent, and fastest-
growing of a selection of future costs facing states as of 2013.”104 Despite the 
strong performance of the stock market in recent years, plan liabilities 
continue to outpace asset growth. The Pew Charitable Trusts estimates the 
total national funding gap to be around $1.37 trillion.105 Finally, demographic 
change due to a long-term trend of slower population growth will limit 
economic growth and place additional pressures on state budgets.106 All of 
these factors reveal the limits of state rainy day funds and demonstrate the 
importance, if not the necessity, of providing an additional funding structure 
that can help respond to major crises. The following sections briefly outline 
a solution. 
1. Fund Structure 
A federal resilience fund could be created using a well-established 
model: the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). As part of the New Deal, the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 created an “Unemployment 
Compensation” (UC) program. 107  The system was structurally federalist, 
with some funding provided by federal payroll taxes and other funding 
 
 101 For a detailed review of the state provisions governing rainy day funds, see NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, RAINY DAY FUND STRUCTURES 8 (2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
Documents/fiscal/RDF_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB4G-C8YF]. 
 102 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 89, at vii. 
 103  Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind0 [https://perma.cc/YGF2-
ZJME]. 
 104 Id. 
 105 David Draine, Keith Sliwa & Emma Wei, Public Pension Investments Largely Recover After 
Pandemic-Related Slide, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/articles/2020/08/25/public-pension-investments-largely-recover-after-pandemic-
related-slide [https://perma.cc/8DNY-GSA3]. 
 106 Fiscal 50: State Trends and Analysis, supra note 103. 
 107  JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22954, THE UNEMPLOYMENT TRUST FUND 
(UTF): STATE INSOLVENCY AND FEDERAL LOANS TO STATES 1 (2018). 
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through state taxes.108 These funds were (and still are) deposited into the 
UTF, which pays out benefits to help manage spikes in unemployment 
during economic crises. 109  The UTF operates countercyclically, building 
funds in prosperous times and paying out in lean times: 
When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax 
revenues. At the same time, UC program spending falls because fewer workers 
are unemployed. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending 
on benefits dampens demand in the economy. It also creates a surplus of funds, 
or a reserve fund, for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. These 
reserve balances are credited in the state’s account within the UTF. During an 
economic slowdown or recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program 
spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The 
increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the 
economic effect of lost earnings by injecting additional funds into the 
economy.110 
States have varying levels of “solvency” in the fund;111 some states have 
more funds available than they would typically need to pay claims in a given 
 
 108 The Federal Unemployment Tax Act imposes “on every employer” a 6% tax on total wages. 
26 U.S.C.§ 3301. Most of the funding comes from the states. JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R44527, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
TAX (FUTA) 1 (2016) (explaining that during “periods of economic expansion or stability, states fund 
approximately 90% of all UC expenditures—as almost all of the benefits are state financed by state 
unemployment taxes”). 
 109 WHITTAKER, supra note 107. 
 110 Id. 
 111 The U.S. Department of Labor reports that, as of February 2020, the solvency levels of thirty-one 
states are “greater than or at the recommended minimum solvency standard.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. 
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INS., DIV. OF FISCAL & ACTUARIAL SERVS., STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: 
TRUST FUND SOLVENCY REPORT 2–3 (2020), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/trustFundSolv
Report2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ64-L7H3]. Twenty-two states and jurisdictions had solvency levels 
below the recommend standard. Id. Solvency can be determined by several different methods. The 
Department of Labor uses a method by which they calculate the Reserve Ratio for a state: 
The simplest solvency measure called the Reserve Ratio is derived by taking the trust fund balance 
and dividing by the state’s total wages paid for the year . . . . This measure can be compared 
against the level of benefits paid in the year divided by the same yearly wages- this ratio is referred 
to as the Benefit Cost Rate. A common comparison is to take the highest Benefit Cost Rate in the 
state’s history and compare it to the Reserve Ratio, or to take the average of the three highest 
Benefit Cost Rates in the last twenty years and compare that to the Reserve Ratio (this is called 
the Average High Cost Multiple). In the latter case, values greater than one (Reserve Ratio divided 
by Average Benefit Cost Rate) are considered the minimum level for adequate state solvency 
going into a recession . . . . 
Id. 
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year.112 In cases in which states do not have sufficient funds, they are able to 
borrow from the federal government under a loan program.113 
A similar countercyclical model could be employed for a national 
resilience fund, with taxes collected during “normal” times and funds spent 
during crises. States have put in place a wide variety of regulations on how 
rainy day funds are created, funded, drawn down, and replenished. 114 
Withdrawal from a rainy day fund is triggered by adverse events including 
economic downturns, health crises, and natural disasters, or simply budget 
shortfalls. 115  As with rainy day funds, states would need to develop 
procedures for determining resilience fund mechanisms and withdrawals. As 
described below, creating specific budgetary triggers—and coordinating 
their use with the rainy day fund—would help ensure the fund is used as 
intended. 
2. Funding Mechanisms 
Rainy day funds are typically funded through year-end budget 
surpluses; tax revenues exceeding a certain amount; and proceeds from the 
sale of oil, gas, or mineral rights; among many other methods.116 Similar to 
the UTF, a national resilience fund need not require a specific source of 
funds, only that the account be built up to a specific threshold—for example, 
15% of prior year expenditures117—through contribution rules that would 
take a very small percentage of 1%–1.5% of general fund revenues. To 
facilitate the buildup of funds, a national wealth tax118 applied to very large 
fortunes over a certain threshold could provide additional funding.119 
 
 112 WHITTAKER, supra note 107, at 9 tbl.2. 
 113 Id. at 4. 
 114 See generally NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 101 (outlining various state 
differences in rainy day fund formation). 
 115 See id. at 8–23 (listing methods of withdrawal and events that trigger withdrawal from rainy day 
funds by each state). 
 116 See generally id. (listing methods of deposit to rainy day funds by each state). 
 117 Mattoon suggests such an amount for his rainy day fund, but given the severity of crises state and 
local governments may face, the total amount may need to be higher. Mattoon, supra note 75, at 14. 
 118 See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1486 (2018) (arguing that a 
wealth tax would be justified because “a constraint on economic inequality may in fact be necessary to 
preserve individual autonomy. . . . [U]nder the relative economic power theory excessive economic 
inequality suppresses the preferences of those with less economic power”). 
 119  Saez and Zucman, for example, model a wealth tax for fortunes of $50 million or more. 
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Fall 2019, at 437, 440–41, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Saez-
Zuchman-final-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGZ7-Z6WE]. 
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3. Withdrawal Mechanisms 
Withdrawal provisions define the circumstances under which funds 
may be drawn down. A withdrawal policy for a national resilience fund 
would allow for withdrawal of funds during defined severe budget crises 
caused by major shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Among other 
purposes, a withdrawal policy may allow for withdrawals in the event of 
revenue shortfalls, revenue growth below a certain trend, general economic 
downturns, and health or safety emergencies.120 Clear rules would maintain 
state incentives to manage their budgets wisely, and withdrawal restrictions 
should limit the amount that may be withdrawn in any given year to ensure 
that funds are available for additional unexpected crises. For example, as 
with rainy day funds, the fund may have a rule that only 33% may be 
withdrawn in a given year, with up to 50% available if extreme conditions 
are met.121 
4. Managing the Fund 
As with the UTF, a national resilience fund could be managed through 
the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Treasury has the expertise and capacity to 
provide necessary administrative services and has years of experience with 
analogous funds.122 A federally managed fund has another benefit: it would 
limit the temptation presented by a large state fund to use the money for 
politically advantageous but inappropriate expenditures—a temptation that 
would seem to grow in proportion to the size of the fund. Strong structural 
and governance protections are necessary to provide adequate insulation of 
the fund from political pressures. The federalist structure of a federally 
managed state account would also help insulate a national fund from federal 
officials who would be prevented from accessing the state funds for federal 
purposes. Likewise, state officials would also be prevented from accessing 
the funds directly, as the fund would only pay out in defined circumstances. 
This shelter from both federal and state political pressures would allow the 
fund to accumulate larger reserves without creating a temptingly large, state-
controlled fund.123 Importantly, however, a national resilience fund would 
 
 120 See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text. 
 121 In his discussion of a national rainy day fund, Mattoon suggests that states “should be permitted 
to withdrawal up to half of their existing balance in a given year” but should have to show severe 
economic need through measures such as “a drop in real revenue over the preceding year or an increase 
in unemployment by 1% or more or a decline in personal income.” Mattoon, supra note 75, at 18. 
 122 Such funds could be administered through the Office of Fiscal Service, which “oversees the 
development and implementation of policies relating to the government’s cash management, operations, 
investment and administration of trust funds, payments, collections, and debt collections.” Fiscal Service, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/domestic-finance/fiscal-service 
[https://perma.cc/A59K-L88D]. 
 123 Mattoon, supra note 75, at 4. 
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provide for state fiscal autonomy while not supplanting important existing 
federal resources such as the Unemployment Trust Fund, the Disaster Relief 
Fund, and—in cases where national resources must be coordinated—
emergency legislation and appropriations. 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, state rainy day funds held 
approximately $75 billion in assets.124 The pandemic is expected to create 
budget shortfalls of over $555 billion for fiscal years 2020–2022 alone.125 
The amount of funds available for state governments will not be enough to 
meet current budget needs, let alone help manage inevitable crises in the 
coming years. A national resilience fund could be a key fiscal tool in helping 
states manage the black elephant risks associated with climate change, 
economic dislocation, pandemics, and systemic injustice. 
While specific details would need to be developed and negotiated, the 
concept of the national fund sketched out here would dramatically improve 
the resiliency of state and local finances in the face of serious crises. A fund 
that is built up over time would be able to mechanically and painlessly 
provide assistance to states without simply shifting costs to the federal 
government, as would be the case in a direct federal bailout. Federal 
assistance in a crisis is not certain, and, as Mattoon notes, “[t]he federal 
government is often in no better fiscal shape in a recession than the states 
and is likely to be grudging in helping states out of a bind.”126 A national 
resilience fund with separate state accounts would motivate the federal 
government to provide state and local support during crises, as the funds 
would not be eligible for allocation at the federal level. 
Finally, a national fund would benefit the federal government by 
“smoothing state fiscal reaction to recessions,” which could “reduce the drag 
that state tax increases or expenditure cuts might have on the national 
economy.”127 While it would not solve the long-term structural challenges 
involved in raising revenues and complying with partially funded mandates, 
a national fund would at least provide a shock absorption mechanism for 
state and local governments that provide many of the services essential to 
legitimate governmental function. Such an ex ante fund would thus help 
 
 124 Rosewicz et al., supra note 80. 
 125 ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES 
CONTINUE TO FACE LARGE SHORTFALLS DUE TO COVID-19 EFFECTS 3 (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-15-20sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/B34M-SXXT]. 
 126 Mattoon, supra note 75, at 4. 
 127 Id. 
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retain government legitimacy during future, inevitable crises due to climate 
change, economic dislocation, pandemics, and systemic injustice. 
